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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46(b)-16 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-
801(8)(1997). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Respondent agrees with the Statement of Issues and the Standard of 
Review provided in the Petitioner's brief. The issue is whether the Labor 
Commission was correct in its legal conclusion that the term "compensation" 
as used in Section 34A-3-110, U.C.A. does not include medical benefits 
payable under the Occupational Disease Act. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of Section 34A-3-110, U.C.A. is of central 
importance in this appeal: 
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The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced 
and limited to the proportion of the compensation that would be 
payable if the occupational disease were the sole cause of 
disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative 
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the 
occupational disease or any part of the disease: 
1. Is causally related to employment with a non-Utah 
employer not subject to commission jurisdiction; 
2. Is of a character to which the employee may have had 
substantial exposure outside of employment or to which 
the general public is commonly exposed; 
3. Is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself 
compensable; or 
4. When disability or death from any other cause not itself 
compensable is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in 
any way contributed to by an occupational disease. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURE 
1. Respondent Jeffrey D. Smith filed an Application for Hearing 
with the Utah Labor Commission on August 11, 2005 wherein he sought 
coverage for a low back condition brought on by years of hard work, including 
heavy lifting and constant bending in his job as a meat packer in a family 
owned business. (R. 16). 
2. The Labor Commission held an evidentiary hearing in this matter 
on July 7, 2006. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were 
entered by the Administrative Law Judge on September 6, 2006 wherein the 
ALJ awarded payment of all reasonable and necessary medical care related to 
Mr. Smith's low back condition. (R. 53-57). 
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3. The Workers' Compensation Fund filed a Motion for Review with 
the Utah Labor Commission on or about October 5, 2006 contesting the full 
award of medical expenses as set forth in the ALJ's decision. (R. 59-61). 
4. On November 30, 2006 the Labor Commission issued its Order 
Affirming ALJ's Decision wherein it determined there should be no 
apportionment of injury related medical expenses in occupational disease 
claims, as set forth in the recent Labor Commission decision of Edmonds v. 
Epixtech, et al (Labor Commission Case No. 02-0969). (R. 68-69). That case 
is currently on appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals, Case No. 20060870-CA. 
It has been briefed and is awaiting scheduling for oral argument. 
5. Petitioner filed its Petition for Review with this court on 
December 27, 2006. 
FACTS 
The underlying facts of Mr. Smith's employment and the nature of his 
occupational disease are not in dispute. The Findings of Fact of the Utah Labor 
Commission have not been contested. In relevant part, they are as follows: 
1. The Respondent has worked since age 16 as a meat cutter in a 
family business. His employment required him to regularly lift 
and manipulate quarters of beef weighing from 100 to 200 pounds, 
haul live cattle, including "downer cows" that required the 
Respondent to prod, shock, push, pull, lift and twist to get these 
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cows into trailers for transport. He is now 40 years old and 
suffers from lumbar degenerative joint disease. (R. 54). 
2. In 2003 he began having increasing problems with his lower back 
and sought medical care for his condition. (R. 54). 
2. His treating physician, Dr. Gordon Kimball, attributes the 
Respondent's low back problems to "years of rigorous work ex: 
lifting, turning, pulling." (Medical exhibit 13). 
3. The Petitioner's medical expert, Dr. Steven Marble, opined in one 
report that 75% of the back problems at L5-S1 are related to work 
and 25% is due to non-work related activities. In a subsequent 
part of his report, he stated that 25% of other degenerative back 
conditions is due to work and 75% is non-industrial. (Medical 
exhibit 9). 
4. The Administrative Law Judge did not send the case to a medical 
panel but awarded coverage for medical treatment for the low 
back, without apportionment in light of the medical reports in the 
file and based upon the Labor Commission ruling in the Edmonds 
v. Epixtech case. (Labor Commission Case 02-0969). This was 
affirmed by the Labor Commission upon Petitioner's Motion for 
Review. (R. 68-69). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The plain language of Section 34A-3-110, U.C.A. provides a formula for 
determining apportionment based on disability or death, making no mention of 
medical expenses. If the term "compensation" were defined to include medical 
benefits, then in cases where there is no disability or death but only medical 
expenses, the statute could not be applied to determine apportionment for any 
pre-existing conditions because the formula in the statute is based on making 
apportionment based on disability or death and what caused it. 
The term "compensation" as used throughout the Utah Labor Code is 
used to reference disability benefits and medical benefits are referred to 
separately. 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted compensation to mean 
something separate from medical expenses and the Utah Legislature in 
subsequent legislation has not taken action to change or overturn the Court's 
conclusions, hence presuming satisfaction with prior judicial constructions of the 
unchanged portions of the statute. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Plain Language of the Statute Requires Apportionment 
Only for Disability or Death Benefits from an Occupational Disease 
And Not for Expenses for Medical Care and Treatment 
The only issue before this Court is whether an injured worker's right to 
payment of medical expenses for treatment of injuries sustained in an 
occupational disease claim is subject to, and reduced by, Section 34A-3-110, 
U.C.A. 
In considering whether the Labor Commission correctly applied the law in 
this matter we should first look to the plain language of the statute itself to 
determine if the meaning of the term "compensation" can be determined from the 
section itself. 
This section, 34A-3-110, U.C.A., simply states that "compensation payable 
under (the occupational disease act) shall be reduced and limited to the proportion 
of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease were the 
sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative factor 
bears to all the causes of the disability or death." (Emphasis added). 
The degree of apportionment under Section 110, as worded, depends upon 
the application of the ratio of work-related disability to non-work disability. The 
statute says nothing about how to compute benefits when there is no disability (or 
death) - such as when an injured worker only required medical care and did not 
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suffer any lost time from work or have any permanent limitations (permanent 
partial disability). 
If compensation under Section 110 as worded were to mean medical 
benefits as well as disability benefits, then apportionment under this section 
would be impossible to apply when there is no disability or death, but only 
medical expenses, because the apportionment formula as worded specifically 
requires apportionment based upon a comparison of work and non-work related 
disability, making no mention of what medical care is related to the industrial 
injury or aggravation. 
Hence, in order for the section to have consistent meaning, the term 
"compensation" must mean something related to disability benefits and not 
medical benefits. 
Had the legislature intended to apportion medical expenses as well, it 
would have been a simple matter to have worded the statute to read something 
like this, where the bold print is the added language: "...limited to the 
proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational 
disease were the sole cause of disability, death or need for medical care and 
treatment, as the occupational disease as a causative factor bears to all the 
causes of the disability, death or need for medical care and treatment." 
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In order to give consistent and proper meaning to all words in Section 
110 requires an interpretation that does not lump medical expenses into the 
meaning of the term "compensation." 
POINT II 
Usage of the Term "Compensation" Throughout the Utah Labor Code 
Applies to Disability Compensation- Benefits That Are Separate 
From Medical Expenses 
The overall usage of the term 'compensation' throughout the statutory 
language itself of Title 34A, the Utah Labor Code, as well as throughout the 
Commission's decisions over the years, is generally limited to compensation 
being equivalent to disability compensation and does not include medical 
benefits. 
There are numerous examples throughout the Code in which the statutory 
usage of the term "compensation" cannot be deemed to include medical 
benefits. A few examples, although not exhaustive, illustrate this usage: 
1. §34A-2-401(l), U.C.A. specifically recognizes the distinction 
between compensation and medical benefits. It provides that the benefits injured 
employees shall be paid include 
(a) compensation . . . and 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
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(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses. 
2. §34A-2-401(2), U.C.A. specifically recognizes this distinction 
when it refers to compensation and medical benefits as separate items: "The 
responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing and hospital 
services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided . . . " shall be on the 
employer and not the employee. 
3. §34A-2-408, U.C.A. similarly makes that specific distinction. 
Paragraph (l)(a) provides that "compensation" may not be allowed for the first 
three days after an injury is received. Paragraph (l)(b) provides that 
disbursements for medical, nurse and hospital services and for medicines and 
funeral expenses are payable for the first three days. This clarifies that medical 
expenses are not to be considered as being included in what is meant as 
compensation. Paragraph (2) of that section provides that, if temporary total 
disability lasts more than 14 days, "compensation" shall be payable for the first 
three days. It is inconceivable that medical expenses would not be paid for the 
first three days following an industrial injury, hence this section makes it clear 
that this is not the case. 
4. §34A-2-413(l)(a), U.C.A. provides: "In cases of permanent total 
disability resulting from an industrial accident or occupational disease, the 
employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section." 
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The section then outlines all of the "compensation" to be paid. In doing 
so, no mention is made of medical benefits or expenses. Nevertheless, an 
injured employee is unquestionably entitled to such medical benefits, although 
they are not part of the "compensation" the employee is to receive. 
5. §34A-2-413(5), U.C.A. provides, "the compensation payable" 
after "312 weeks of compensation" shall be reduced by 50% of the Social 
Security retirement benefits. If compensation included medical benefits, this 
Social Security offset would apply against medical expenses incurred as well as 
the PTD benefits that are payable. However, medical benefits are not and have 
never been reduced once an injured worker begins receiving Social Security 
retirement benefits. 
6. §34A-2-422, U.C.A. provides: "Compensation before payment 
shall be exempt from all claims of creditors . . . and shall be paid only to 
employees or their dependents . . . " Again, if medical benefits were included in 
the definition, this would mean that all medical expenses must be paid directly 
to the employees themselves, rather than directly to the medical providers. This 
has never been the practice in the adjudication of workers compensation claims 
in this state. 
7. §34A-2-301, U.C.A. provides that places of employment are to 
be safe and that, for the willful failure of an employee to comply with 
applicable provisions or safety requirements, "Compensation as provided in this 
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chapter shall be increased 15% . . ." Under Appellants' argument, this would 
mean that, if an employer's safety violation impacted the employee, the 
employer would have to pay the medical providers an additional 15%, 
something which has never been done and which would not serve the purpose 
intended or, for that matter, any other logical purpose. 
8. In addition to the foregoing, §34A-3-107, U.C.A. emphasizes that 
there is nothing under the occupational disease act which is intended to treat an 
employee's right to medical benefits any differently than he would be treated for 
a similar workers compensation injury. In paragraph (2) of §34A-3-107, it 
specifically provides that, "The disabled employee is entitled to medical, 
hospital and burial expenses equivalent to those provided in Chapter 2," with no 
mention of apportionment or reference to Section 110. 
There would be no equivalence if the payment of medical benefits were 
reduced by whatever percentage of pre-existing conditions were related to the 
occupational disease with no reduction of medical benefits in a regular workers 
compensation claim where there are related pre-existing conditions. 
POINT III 
Utah Case Law Supports the Conclusion That The Term "Compensation" 
Does Not Include Medical Benefits, and That Conclusion Has Not Been 
Overturned by Subsequent Statutory Changes to the Utah Labor Code 
In 1979, the Utah Supreme Court in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979), concluded that the term "compensation" 
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did not include medical benefits. This was affirmed again in Christensen v. 
Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). 
We would note that despite the clear statement of the Utah Supreme Court 
differentiating medical benefits from compensation, the Utah legislature did not 
subsequently amend the Workers' Compensation Act or Occupational Disease 
Act to specify that compensation includes medical benefits. Rather in all 
subsequent substantial amendments to the Act in 1988, 1991, 1994, as well as in 
amendments in other years, the legislature has not changed the statutes to specify 
a definition of compensation that includes medical expenses. 
Further, there is no definition of the term "compensation" in the 
Occupational Disease Act itself. 
Hence, the meaning of compensation, as interpreted by the Utah Supreme 
Court, has been allowed to stand, notwithstanding the many substantial changes to 
the Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Acts over the years. 
As cited in Christensen, "a well-established canon of statutory construction 
provides that where a legislature amends a portion of a statute but leaves other 
portions unamended, or re-enacts them without change, the legislature is 
presumed to have been satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unchanged 
portions of the statute and to have adopted them as consistent with its own intent. 
State v. Roberts. 56 Utah 136, 190 P. 351 (1920); Ouaremba v. Allan. 67 N J. 1, 
334 A.2d 321 (1975); Ladd v. Board of Trustees. 23 Cal. App.3d 984,100 Cal. 
14 
Rptr. 571 (1972); People v. Mills. 40 I11.2d 4, 237 N.E.2d 697 (1968)." 
Christensen at 756. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the respondent respectfully asks this Court to 
fully affirm the final order of the Utah Labor Commission in this matter. 
Dated this 16th day of March, 2007. 
Attorney for Respondent Jeffrey D. Smith 
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